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 1 
Editors’ Note 
 
Expanding the scope of dispute resolution and access to justice: The Use of Mediation 
Within the Courts 
- Masood Ahmed and Dorcas Quek Anderson 
 
The relationship between civil litigation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has always 
been an uneasy one. As Briggs LJ (as he then was) in PGF II SA v OMFS Co 1 Ltd observed, 
the current constraints affecting the provision of resources for civil litigation “call for an ever-
increasing focus upon means of ensuring that court time, both for trial and for case management, 
is proportionately directed towards disputes which really need it, with an ever-increasing 
responsibility thrown upon the parties…to engage in ADR, wherever that offers a reasonable 
prospect of producing a just settlement at proportionate cost.”1 The courts’ encouragement of 
the use of mediation is meant to enhance access to justice and facilitate the proportionate 
allocation of court resources for civil litigation. Yet the courts have been divided on the 
question of when mediation indeed offers a “reasonable prospect of producing a just 
settlement”. The Court of Appeal in Thakkar v Patel2 and PGF obliged a party who was invited 
to mediation to seriously consider the offer, regardless of the party’s belief in the merits of his 
case.3 In marked contrast, Patten LJ in Gore v Naheed did not consider it unreasonable for a 
party to decline mediation when mediation had no realistic prospect of success and there were 
complex questions of law to be determined.4 The contrasting judicial positions demonstrate 
that the connection between using mediation and enhancing access to justice is not always 
evident in every case.  
 
This issue of Civil Justice Quarterly focuses on the challenging tensions to be resolved by the 
courts in their encouragement of the use of mediation. It features eight articles that were 
presented at a research forum discussing the court’s use of mediation to expand the scope of 
dispute resolution and access to justice. Drawing from the civil justice experiences in England 
and Wales, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and other common law countries, the 
authors have examined a variety of issues including the mandatory use of mediation, the 
changing role of the judge in advancing access to justice, the evolution of the concept of the 
multi-door courthouse, ethical issues arising from the courts’ involvement in settlement 
activities and the implications of introducing an online court.  
 
Collectively, these articles provide multiple perspectives on a more profound question in civil 
justice: what are the proper limits to the evolution of civil justice to make it more accessible? 
Higgins and Zuckerman have argued that the amount of process for each dispute is “the most 
forensically accurate procedure that can be delivered at proportionate cost and within a 
                                                        
1 [2013] EWCA Civ 1288; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 1386.  
2 [2017] EWCA Civ 117. 
3 Masood Ahmed, “Mediation: The Need for a United, Clear and Consistent Judicial Voice” (2018) 1 CJQ 369. 
4 [2017] EWCA Civ 369.  
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reasonable time”.5 Mediation represents a process that can greatly reduce the time and cost of 
litigation. However, not all litigants are amenable to resolving their dispute consensually in 
place of undergoing an adjudicative process. Additionally, the courts’ incorporation of 
mediation into the civil justice process raises questions concerning the scope of the court’s 
involvement in settlement, the impact on open justice and the proper balance between party 
autonomy and the courts’ proactive role in litigation. 
 
The courts’ encouragement of ADR in Singapore 
A comparative analysis of the recent civil justice reforms in England and Wales and Singapore 
reflects the continual efforts to enhance access to justice through greater use of ADR, and the 
attendant struggles in delineating the limits that should constrain the expanding scope of 
dispute resolution. The Singapore courts have embedded the use of ADR within the pre-trial 
civil justice process. The parties are encouraged by a registrar or judge to consider mediation 
at pre-trial conferences or other hearings. In 2013, the Supreme Court introduced a process to 
allow parties to file an “ADR Offer” indicating their willingness to participate in ADR. The 
party receiving the ADR Offer is given 14 days to file a “Response to ADR Offer”, stating 
whether he or she agrees to the other party’s proposal, and providing detailed reasons for any 
refusal. The failure by a party to file a Response to ADR Offer within the stipulated time is 
taken to mean that the party is unwilling to participate in ADR without providing any reasons.6  
 
A similar stance has been adopted in the Singapore State Courts for civil claims below 
S$250,000. There has been a “presumption of ADR” for all civil disputes since 2012.7  This 
means that disputes are routinely referred to a mode of ADR unless a party chooses to opt out. 
All parties must file an “ADR Form” at the pre-trial stage.8  The form provides information on 
the different ADR options and requires parties and their lawyers to indicate whether they wish 
to use any form of ADR. Similar to the practice in the Supreme Court, the parties have to 
provide reasons for any refusal to use ADR. 9 Additionally, the State Courts provide court ADR 
services, including mediation and early neutral evaluation, at a low cost.  
 
Both the Supreme Court and State Courts may take into account the parties’ degree of 
engagement in ADR in exercising their discretion as to costs.10  The spectre of adverse cost 
sanctions due to an unreasonable refusal to use ADR is highlighted in the courts’ forms. 
Nevertheless, unlike the UK courts, the Singapore courts have not elaborated on the factors 
that should be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a decision not to use ADR. Only 
one reported decision awarded costs on an indemnity basis because the respondent did not 
explore the use of mediation and also exhibited unreasonable litigation conduct. However, 
                                                        
5 A Higgins and A Zuckerman, “Lord Justice Briggs’ ‘SWOT’ Analysis Underlines English Law’s Troubled 
Relationship with Proportionate Costs’” (2017) 36 CJQ 1.  
6 Supreme Court Practice Directions (2010 Revised Edition), Singapore, paragraph 35C and Forms 28-29.  
7. State Courts Practice Directions, Singapore, para. 35(9).  
8. State Courts Practice Directions, Singapore, para. 36(4) and Form 7.  
9. State Courts Practice Directions, Singapore, Form 7. 
10. Rules of Court (Cap 322, s 80, Revised Edition 2014, Singapore) Order 59 rule 5(1)(c) 
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there was little elaboration on how the court would appraise a party’s decision not to engage in 
ADR.11  
 
While post-trial costs sanctions create a strong disincentive against rejecting the use of 
mediation, this mechanism may only be triggered after the refusal and consequently has limited 
effectiveness for the instant case. Furthermore, as evident from the UK jurisprudence discussed 
below, the courts’ exercise of discretion based on the weighing of the relevant factors is a 
nuanced decision, and may not always reflect a consistent approach across different decisions. 
Significantly, this approach also gives weight to the importance of voluntary participation in 
mediation, and therefore declines to compel the use of mediation. 
 
There has been a palpable shift in the Singapore courts’ recent approach to encourage the use 
of mediation – from imposing cost sanctions based on the courts’ post-action assessment of the 
parties’ engagement with mediation, to mandating the use of mediation at an early stage. In 
2014, a simplified regime to deal with civil claims below S$60,000 was introduced. The court 
is empowered to order the parties in such cases to use ADR if it is “of the view that doing so 
would facilitate the resolution of the dispute between the parties”.12  
 
Furthermore, Singapore’s civil justice landscape is presently at the cusp of momentous reform, 
with key reforms relating to the use of ADR. A few months ago, two civil procedure reform 
committees recommended sweeping reforms to the civil justice regime, including the 
imposition of a duty on parties to consider amicable resolution of the dispute prior to 
commencing legal proceedings and during the course of the action. Parties who are unwilling 
to use mediation must demonstrate compelling reasons why ADR is inappropriate. The court 
may order the parties to use ADR if it takes the view that this duty has not been discharged. 
The committees further proposed retaining the courts’ power to make adverse costs orders 
taking into account the parties’ conduct in using mediation, but called for more robust use of 
such costs sanctions. These reforms have been proposed together with suggestions to limit the 
number of interlocutory applications and give the court greater flexibility in pre-trial case 
management.13   
  
If approved, these proposed changes will substantially enlarge the courts’ role in controlling 
litigation conduct and deciding whether ADR is appropriate, while concurrently reducing the 
parties’ autonomy in deciding to use ADR. The recommendation to consider ADR before 
commencing legal proceedings also reflects a move from dispute resolution towards earlier 
dispute containment and prevention. Early triage and the assessment of the parties’ litigation 
                                                        
11 Foo Jee Boo v Foo Jhee Tuang [2016] SGHC 260 at [220] to [225].  
12 Rules of Court (Cap 322, s 80, Revised Edition 2014), Order 108 rule 3(3). 
13 Ministry of Law, Public Consultation on Civil Justice Reforms, Recommendations of the Civil Justice Review 
Committee and Civil Justice Commission (26 October 2018), available at  
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Press%20Release/Public%20consultation%20on%20
proposed%20reforms%20to%20the%20Civil%20Justice%20System/Annex%20A%20Public%20consultation%
20paper%20on%20civil%20justice%20reforms.pdf (accessed 14 November 2018) at 9. 
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approach will assume greater significance. A similar shift has occurred in many other common 
law jurisdictions, including Australia’s civil justice regime requiring parties to set out the steps 
taken to resolve their dispute before filing an originating claim,14  and the future Online 
Solutions Court providing for early triage and problem diagnosis. 
 
Nonetheless, the pertinent questions of when ADR is unsuitable, and when it is reasonable to 
opt out, have to be addressed by the Singapore courts. These questions will invariably have to 
be considered for the courts to decide when to exercise its power to mandate the use of ADR. 
Such power should be wielded in a principled way in order to avoid the excessive diminution 
of the parties’ consent in using ADR, and a blunt approach premised on the assumption that 
one dispute resolution mode size fits all cases. Admittedly, the strong push to encourage the 
use of mediation may substantially ameliorate the problem of disproportionate cost of litigation. 
The challenge lies in ensuring that the court’s power is exercised appropriately in each case to 
strike the best balance between cost, time and accuracy. 
 
The English civil justice reforms   
The English civil justice system is currently experiencing another wave of major reforms15 in 
a further attempt to enhance access to justice for all, with ADR also being a prominent feature 
of the changes.16 The most radical proposal of the current reforms is the introduction of an 
Online Solutions Court (“OSC”)17 in the resolution of low value monetary claims. As Briggs 
LJ, the author of the reforms, put it, “The development of the Online Court is the single most 
radical and important structural change with which this report is concerned.” Forming part of 
the mainstream civil justice system, the OSC will allow access to justice for people and small 
businesses of ordinary financial resources. Briggs LJ’s vision draws inspiration from the earlier 
proposal of a three-tier structured court originally proposed by the Civil Justice Council in its 
report Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims Report and, to a limited extent, 
the proposals made by Justice in Delivering Justice in an Age of Austerity. Both the CJC and 
Justice reports placed emphasis on early triage to contain and prevent disputes and the 
utilisation of online dispute resolution procedures in the early settlement of disputes.  
 
Briggs LJ’s OSC will consist of three stages. Stage 1, which is currently subject to a successful 
pilot,18 is mainly an automated process by which users are assisted, though online processes, 
in identifying their claim or defence and uploading any evidence the parties may wish to rely 
on. The matter will then proceed to stage 2 which will involve a mixture of ADR and case 
management by a case officer. If the matter cannot be settled at stage 2 then the case officer 
will manage the matter to stage 3 which will consist of determination by judges either on the 
                                                        
14 Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (No 17, 2011, Australia) s 4.  
15 CCSR Briggs Interim and Final Report. 
16 Woolf, Jackson on costs and Briggs Chancery Review. 
17 The name has since changed to ‘Online Civil Money Claims’ but for the purposes of this paper the author shall 
use the term Online Solutions Court.  
18 It is governed by Civil Procedure Rules Practice Direction 51R. It will run until 2019. 
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documents, on the telephone, by video or at face-to-face hearings, but with no default 
assumption that there must be a traditional trial.  
 
The most pertinent features of the OSC are those relating to the greater utilisation of ADR 
procedures in the resolution of disputes. Stage 2, in particular, will place a positive duty on the 
parties to engage in an ‘ADR dialogue’ with each other and the case officer to consider whether 
the dispute would benefit from ADR and, if so, the most appropriate type of ADR procedure. 
Here, Briggs LJ’s objective is to give practical effect to his vision to bring about a cultural 
change in the manner in which disputes are managed within the civil court process. That culture 
change, first advocated by Briggs LJ in his Chancery Modernisation Review, is to replace the 
process of judicial case management and preparation of disputes to trial with a more pragmatic 
approach of managing disputes to a resolution which would include settlement through an 
appropriate ADR procedure.  
 
Despite advocating the need for greater emphasis on ADR procedures in the resolution of civil 
disputes, Briggs LJ remained consistent with the orthodox judicial stance in rejecting 
compulsory ADR. Embracing compulsory ADR would, it is argued, undermine the 
constitutional rights of citizens to access the courts. Rather, the courts should educate disputing 
parties on the nature and benefits of ADR as well as utilising their costs powers in penalising 
a party for unreasonably refusing ADR.19 However, despite this orthodox judicial stance on 
compulsory ADR, the jurisprudence surrounding the extent to which parties are obliged to 
consider and engage with ADR is far from satisfactory. Two recent Court of Appeal decisions 
illustrate the contradictory judicial approaches to the parties’ ADR obligations. 
 
Thakkar was an appeal against a costs order in favour of the claimants who had taken active 
steps in organising a mediation which was ultimately abandoned because of the defendant 
‘dragging’ its feet and its failure to cooperate with the process. The matter proceeded to trial at 
which the claimants were awarded £44,933.52 on their claim and the defendants were awarded 
£16,750 on their counterclaim. After weighing up all the circumstances, the judge ordered the 
defendants to pay 75 per cent of the claimants’ costs of the claim. The defendants appealed on 
the ground that the judge had erred in the exercise of his discretion concerning costs. Jackson 
LJ agreed with the judge’s finding that there was a real chance that the matter would have 
settled because, inter alia, a skilled mediator would have assisted the parties by pointing to the 
small gap between their respective positions and the huge future costs of the litigation. Citing 
PGF II SA v OMFS Co 1 Ltd 20 in which the Court of Appeal held that silence in the face of 
an offer to mediate was, as a general rule, unreasonable conduct meriting a costs sanction, 
Jackson LJ held, "The message which this court sent out in PGF II was that to remain silent in 
the face of an offer to mediate is, absent exceptional circumstances, unreasonable conduct 
meriting a costs sanction, even in cases where mediation is unlikely to succeed." 
 
                                                        
19 Jackson Report Chapter 36. 
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In Gore v Naheed the defendants’ invitation to mediation was rejected by the claimant. The 
defendants lost at first instance and they appealed both on the substantive issues and the costs 
order which was made against them. On the issue of costs, the defendants, relying on PGF, 
argued that the judge should have made some allowance in their favour for the fact that the 
claimant had refused to engage with their invitation to mediation. However, Patten LJ rejected 
the defendants’ arguments. Adopting the opposite approach to that of Jackson LJ in Thakkar, 
Patten LJ placed emphasis on the judge’s finding that the matter was too complex for mediation 
and on the right of a litigant to have his matter determined by the court. As his Lordship 
explained "Speaking for myself, I have some difficulty in accepting that the desire of a party 
to have his rights determined by a court of law in preference to mediation can be said to be 
unreasonable conduct particularly when, as here, those rights are ultimately vindicated."20  
 
Aside from reaching a contradictory position to PGF and Thakkar, Patten LJ’s agreement with 
the judge’s finding that the matter was too complex for mediation does not hold weight. The 
Court of Appeal has consistently held that the complexity of a matter is not a valid justification 
for rejecting mediation. Ward LJ in Burchell v Bullard, a construction matter, did not hesitate 
in dismissing the "complexity" argument when he said,  "The defendants behaved unreasonably 
in believing, if they did, that their case was so watertight that they need not engage in attempts 
to settle. They were counterclaiming almost as much to remedy some defective work as they 
had contracted to pay for the whole of the stipulated work. There was clearly room for give 
and take. The stated reason for refusing mediation that the matter was too complex for 
mediation is plain nonsense."21 And a similar approach was taken by Rix LJ in Rolf v De 
Gurein.22 
 
Stage 2 of the OSC can potentially introduce the clarity and consistency needed on the issue of 
compulsory ADR. Having an opt-out system or an automatic referral to mediation or other 
forms of ADR at stage 2 would be more desirable than simply leaving it at the discretion of the 
parties who may simply engage in an ADR dialogue with the intention of simply ‘ticking-the-
box’ in order to proceed to judicial determination at stage 3. An opt-out system would 
automatically refer the parties to a variety of ADR procedures which they would discuss with 
the case officer before participating in the most appropriate ADR procedure. But this would 
not mean that the parties will be obliged to settle their differences during the ADR process – 
that would clearly be a breach of the parties’ article 6 rights to a fair trial.23 The parties would 
simply be required to engage with an appropriate ADR procedure and to explore whether their 
                                                        
20 Gore at [49]. 
21 Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358 at [41].  
22 Rolf v De Gurein. [2011] EWCA Civ 78. 
23 Art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights provides “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.” 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Civil Justice Quarterly 
following peer review. The definitive published version (2019) 38(1) CJQ 1-8 is available online on Westlaw UK or 
from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. Not to be cited, copied or reproduced without permission of journal and 
authors. 
 
 7 
differences can be settled without the need to proceed to stage 3.  Clearly, the parties would be 
at liberty to leave the process at any point before a final settlement agreement is concluded. 
The parties would be permitted to opt-out on very limited grounds (e.g. where there were 
limitation issues). As well as educating the parties of the nature and the most appropriate type 
of ADR procedure for the particular dispute, the system would incorporate and reinforce the 
parties’ ADR obligations with reference to the risk of parties being penalised in costs at stage 
3 in the event that they unreasonably refuse ADR at stage 2. Currently, there is no mention 
within the current OSC structure of the risk of cost sanctions for failing to consider and engage 
with ADR; this is a major weakness. The absence of this effective procedural mechanism 
undermines the intentions to enhance the role and effectiveness of ADR and, as a consequence, 
greater access to justice.  
 
The search for the right approach to encourage the use of ADR 
The English and Singaporean civil justice reforms reflect continual efforts to arrive at an 
optimal mechanism to encourage the greater use of consensual ADR for appropriate cases. The 
current array of mechanisms may be charted along a “continuum of mandatoriness”, ranging 
from requiring attendance at a mediation orientation session and  imposing soft sanctions, to 
the more extreme measures of having an opt-out system and mandating mediation with no 
exemptions.24 Singapore’s current regime resembles an opt-out system because of the courts’ 
embedding of the consideration of ADR within the court process, coupled with the spectre of 
cost sanctions for unreasonable refusal to attempt ADR. However, the lack of reported 
decisions on costs sanctions has probably diminished the effectiveness of the opt-out system, 
resulting in current proposals for the court to order the use of mediation in suitable cases. On 
the other hand, the English courts have imposed robust cost sanctions, albeit with inconsistent 
decisions. Although the future OSC will embed ADR into the court process for low value 
claims, there is yet to be an opt-out system allowing the parties to decline the use of ADR based 
on limited grounds. 
 
Lord Justice Neuberger has aptly observed that steering the middle ground by penalising parties 
for failure to mediate has obvious attractions, but such an approach has not had a particularly 
happy history.25 The English and Singapore experiences attest to some of these drawbacks, 
thus underscoring the need to implement more rigorous mechanisms that will effectively nudge 
parties to use ADR. A rigorous opt-out system and the mandating of mediation in suitable cases 
will shift the court’s assessment of the appropriateness of mediation from the post-trial stage 
to a much earlier juncture. Under either mechanism, it is critical for the courts to clearly 
articulate the factors guiding the exercise of their power to mandate mediation or determining 
the  scope for opting out. ambit for opting out. The success of both mechanisms also hinges on 
                                                        
24 Dorcas Quek, “Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-
Mandated Mediation Program” (2010) 11 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 479. 
25 Lord Justice Neuberger, “Keynote Address: A View from on High Civil Mediation Conference 2015” (12 May 
2015), available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-150512-civil-mediation-conference-2015.pdf 
(accessed 14 November 2018) para. 22. 
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adopting a consistent and united judicial stance. Only then can the judiciary support the use of 
mediation on a practical and principled basis, strongly recommending its use whenever it is 
justifiable based on costs and time while also avoiding the carte blanche approach of mandating 
mediation in all situations. Lord Justice Neuberger’s observations are pertinent in this regard:  
It should not be impossible for citizens to have proper access to the courts – ie with 
decent legal advice and legal representation. However, and I do not say this in a 
spirit of recrimination, but simply as a matter of melancholy fact: the legal 
profession’s charges, the court system’s procedures and government cuts and 
charges render it difficult if not impossible for many citizens to get access to the 
courts. In those circumstances, provided that its costs are proportionate to the issues 
involved, mediation appears in practice to be the only alternative. Whatever may be 
said about mediation as an alternative to litigation as a matter of principle, it appears 
to be quite a satisfactory alternative in practice at any rate to many people - at least 
judging by the reported outcomes.26  
 
 
 
 
 
Masood Ahmed, University of Leicester 
and Dorcas Quek Anderson, Singapore Management University 
 
                                                        
26 Keynote Address, para. 26.    
